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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an analysis and summary of the effects of the
Workers' Compensation (WC) system on wages and work injury experience.
It stresses how lessons learned from other forms of social insurance can
be applied to research on WC.
I begin with a brief overview of the characteristics of the WC
system. Next, some simple labor market models are sketched that provide
implications about how the system might affect employee compensation and
the frequency and duration of both work injuries and reported WC claims.
The bilk of the paper critically analyzes the relevant empirical literature,






In many respects the structure of the workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance systems are similar. Each is actually a system of
individual state systems. Both are financed by a payroll tax that is
imperfectly experience rated. Both provide insurance against an adverse
consequence (work injury or unemployment) that leads to time away from
work; the incidence and duration of these events are at least partially
determined by both employer and employee behavior. Both systems provide,
at least for temporary events, a structure of benefits that ties compensa-
tion to a worker's previous earnings.
Because of these similarities, it is not totally insane for an
individual who has conducted some previous research on the unemployment
insurance (UI) system, but none on the workers' compensation (WC) system,
to provide an analysis and summary of the effects of the latter on work
injury experience. Indeed, one contribution of this paper will be to point
out how lessons learned from research on other forms of social insurance
can be applied tO research on WC. Nonetheless there are important dif-
ferences in, and complexities of, the WC system that analyses of it must
take into account; these are highlighted in the paper as well.
I begin in the next section with a brief overview of the character-
istics of the WC system. Section III sketches some simple labor market
models that provide implications about how the system might affect employee
compensation and the frequency and duration of work injuries. Succeeding
sections critically analyze the empirical literature on these effects. A
final section provides some concluding remarks.2
II. Characteristics of the Workers' Compensation System1
As mentioned above, the WC system is actually a system of state
systems; variations in values of key parameters across states provide the
basis of many of the empirical analyses discussed later. WC benefits are a
form of no fault insurance in which employers agree to pay specified
benefits to workers injured on the job in return for limited liability.
The no—fault aspect of it, however, still leaves employers the right to
challenge claims on such grounds as the injury did not take place on the
job, the injury is not as severe as the employee claims, oran injured
employee is not returning to work as quickly as is possible. The frequency
with which claims are challenged maywellvary across states.2
Five types of benefits are paid-under the WC system. First, uncompen—
sated medical expenses are paid to injured workers. Second, temporary
total disability (TTD) benefits are paid to injured workers who temporarily
cannot work at all, but for whom full recovery is expected. There typically
is a waiting period, which varies across states, before benefits commence,
and the benefits are specified as a fraction of pre-injury earnings. This
fraction, the income replacement rate usually is set at two—thirds,
however, each state specifies a minimum and maximum benefit level (the
latter is often tied to average weekly earnings in the state).
Third, permanent total disability (PTD) benefits are paid when an
individual is permanently prevented from working at all. The structure of
benefits is similar to TTP benefits; in some cases there is also a maximum
duration of time that benefits may be received.
Fourth, permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits are paid for
injuries that are expected, even after the healing period, to result in
permanent physical injury and limitations and/or limitations on actual
earnings capacity. In many states these benefits are determined exante and3
are not conditional on expost loss of earnings while in a few states
benefits for certain types of injuries (nonscheduled ones) depend on actual
earnings loss. In these latter states benefits for other types of injuries
(scheduled ones) do not depend on actual earnings loss. In most states,
however, nonscheduled berefits do not depend on actual earnings loss.
Finally, burial and survival benefits paid on death claims are a small
share of claims. PPD and TTD are, in order, the two most important
categories of indemnity claims based on dollar expenditures (together
representing over 80% of WC indemnity Costs), while TTD claims are by far
the most frequent type of claims.
Most firms purchase insurance against WC claims,depending upon the
state either from a government or a private insurance carrier (some states
offer both options). Premiums are paid by employers as a percentage of
total payroll. Small employers are manual rated or charged a premium based
upon historical experience of the industry class to which they belong. As
a result, their WC payroll tax is imperfectly experience rated in the sense
that, at the margin, they do not bear the full cost of WC benefits paid to
their employees.
As an employer become larger the manual rate is modified more and more
to reflect the injury experience of the firm. Indeed, very large firms'
rates depend solely on their own historical experience; they are said to be
perfectly experience rated (in principle they bear the full costs of WC
benefits received by their employees). Large firms also have the option of
self—insuring, which also leads to perfect experience rating. In general,
over a wide range of finn sizes WC costs are imperfectly experience rated,
with the extent of experience rating increasing with firm size.34
Two final points warrant mention here. First, WC benefits are not
taxable; thus the net worth of them depends upon a workers' family income
bracket. Second, recipients of WC benefits may receive other forms of
Insurance benefits that are conditioned either on their disability status
(e.g., social security or private disability payments) or their family
income level (e.g., food stamps). Analyses of incentive effects of WC
benefits should (but typically don't) take into account both the tax
treatment of WC benefits and these other forms of benefits.
III. Workers' Compensation Effects: Theory4
Consider a simplified world in which the labor market is competitive,
workers have perfect information about the risks of injury associated with
each job and there are no barriers to mobility between jobs. Suppose also
that firms differ in their production technology, each technology has
certain Inherent risks of injury associated with It, these risks can be
reduced if firms expend resources to do so, and that the marginal cost (to
the employer) of reducing risks, varies across firms
Assume also initially, that workers value positively their expected
earnings per period (earnings times the probability of not being injured)
and negatively (due to pain and suffering) the probability of being
Injured. Workers will move to firms whose earnings—risk of injury combina-
tion maximizes their well—being and, if all workers have identical pre-
ferences, higher risk of injury firms would have; to pay higher wages to
attract any workers. The mobility of workers would thus lead to fully
compensating wage differentials or wage differentials that compensate
workers for the disutility they would suffer from risk of injury.55
In such a world, firms would choose the wage rate—risk of injury
combination to offer so that their marginal cost of injury reduction just
equals their marginal benefits from injury reduction. The former includes
the costs of resources devoted to preventing accidents, while the latter
includes the lower wage bill associated with the lower accident rate, less
down time in production, and reduced hiring and training costs of replace-
ments for injured workers. If the marginal cost of preventing accidents
varied across firms, different firms would offer different "wage—injury
rate packages".
In such a world, the introduction of WC benefits that were perfectly
experience rated (and contained no loading or administrative charges) would
not affect the injury rate at any firm. Rather, since WC benefits would
now compensate workers if they were injured, smaller compensating wage
differentials would be required to attract workers to high injury rate
firms. Thus, higher WC benefits should lead to lower wages at each firm.
WC benefits would not affect the optimal injury rate from each firm's
perspective since the firm's reduction in -wage costs would just be offset
by the new WC costs.
Suppose instead, WC benefits were not perfectly experience rated. In
this case, the reduction in wage costs due to the payment of WC benefits to
workers would be greater than the employers' liability for the benefits.
The marginal benefits of preventing accidents would therefore fall and
employers would spend fewer resources on injury reduction. Imperfect
experience rating then would lead to a higher injury rate than would exist
either in the absence of the WC system, or in the presence of a WC system
that was perfectly experience rated.6
Of course all of the above presupposes a perfectly competitive labor
market; one in which wage differentials arise to fully compensate workers
for risk of injury. In such a world, if workers are risk neutral, there Is
in fact little rationale for a WC system.6 If, however, fully compensating
wage differentials do not arise, the predicted effects of WC benefits are
quite different.
Consider again the case of a perfectly experience rated WC system
where employers bear the full costs of the WC benefits paid to their
employees. In this situation, where wage differentials do not initially
fully compensate workers for risk of injury, employers' marginal costs of
injuries would rise In the presence of WC benefits (wages would not fall
sufficiently to offset the cost of WC benefits). As such, employers would
have Increased incentives to take actions to reduce injury rates and one
would expect to observe a decline in the injury rate.7
From the employers' side of the labor market then, the effect of the
WC system, or higher WC benefits on employer resources devoted to reducing
work injuries and hence the Injury rate is ambiguous. If wage differen-
tials do fully compensate workers for the risk of injury and the WC is
imperfectly experience rated, the injury rate may actually increase. If
wage differentials are not fully compensating and the WC system Is per-
fectly experience rated the Injury rate will decrease. Empirical analyses
are required to resolve the ambiguity.
One should distinguish, however, between employer incentives to
increase resources devoted to injury prevention, and thus decrease the
injury rate, and employer incentives to reduce both the Incidence and
duration of WC claims. As long as WC benef its are at least partially
experience rated, higher WC benefits Increase employers' incentives to both
challenge WC claims and to encourage injured workers to speed their7
recovery and return to work. Even if increasing WC benefits does not alter
employer resources devoted to injury prevention, it may affect the number
and duration of WC claims.
The above discussion focuses on the employer side of the labor market.
Increasing temporary total WC benefits may also affect injury rates and
claims by influencing employee behavior in a number of ways. First, higher
WC benefits may reduce the disutility workers feel when they have minor and
temporary illnesses. Thus, higher benefits may reduce the precautions they
take on the job to prevent types of accidents that are unlikely to lead to
serious permanent injuries. Second, higher benefit levels increase
employees' incentives to file claims for minor injuries where the need to
remain temporarily off the job is ambiguous.8 Third, to the extent that
workers at least partially control the speed at which rehabilitation from
temporary disability occurs, higher benefits increase workers' incentives
to prolong their recovery period.
Higher temporary total disability benefit levels may lead from
workers' perspectives, then, to increased WC claims. Whether this is due to
increased injury rates caused by less worker precaution or to increased
probability of filing a claim, given a marginal injury, is important to
determine. Higher benefits may also lead to longer durations for indi-
vidual claims, however this does not imply average claim duration would
lengthen. If the higher benefits induce a lot of claims based on less
severe injuries, average claim duration might actually fall.
Permanent partial disability benefits may affect WC claim rates and
the supply of labor by disabled workers to the market as well. One must
distinguish here between scheduled and nonscheduled benefits that are not
contingent on actual earnings loss and nonscheduled benefits that are. In
the former case, benefits are typically not contingent on work effort after8
the benefit determination date; they are specified as a lump—sum or weekly
amount. These benefits increase the injured individual's wealth (assuming
his medical expenses have also been fully compensated). To the extent that
individuals value leisure time as well as income, higher scheduled benefits
should lead to lower hours of work and reduced fraction of time in the
labor force.
In some states, however, for example New York and Florida, nonsched-
uled benefits are specified as a fraction of preinjury earnings, or of some
estimate of earnings capacity lost, subject to minimum and maximum benefit
levels. Benefits here are contingent on work effort and like any income
transfer system of this type (e.g., AFDC) higher wage replacement rates
encourage reduced labor force participation and hours of work. Further-
more, the formulae used to compute benefits under such systems do not take
into account that economic conditions may affect Injured workers' earnings
prospects; benefit levels do not depend on local unemployment rates. Since
higher unemployment rates reduce the actual earnings prospects of some
injured workers relative to their nonscheduled permanent partial WC
benefits, one would expect permanent partial claim rates for nonscheduled
benefits in these states to increase when unemployment rates are high.
In sum, WC benefit levels, operating through both the employer and
employee side of the market should be expected to influence the magnitude
of compensating wage differentials, employer efforts to reduce Injury
rates, injury rates per se, the number and types:of WC claims, the dura-
tions of different types of claims, and the labor force attachment and
hours of work of Injured workers. It is to an analysis of the empirical
evidence on many of these effects that Lnow turn.9
IV.CompensatingWage Differentials
The first issue is whether markets "work" in the sense that wage
differentials arise to compensate workers for exposure to risk of injury.
Numerous studies have used cross—section data, with either establishments
or individuals as the unIts of observation, and attempted to ascertain if
wage rates are positively associated with various measures of injury risk
(fatal accident rates, nonfatal accident rates, work days lost due to
accident rates, etc.), after other personal characteristics that should
influence wages (e.g., education, experience) are controlled for.9
These studies uniformly tend to find that there is a positive associ-
ation between fatal accident rates and wages. However, the relationship
between nonfatal accident rates and wages is less well—established; appear-
ing in some studies but not in others. Most studies find that the magni-
tude of compensating wage differentials is larger in the union sector than
the nonunion sector,'° an expected result given that accident rates tend to
be higher in the union sector and that unions may serve the role of winning
wage differentials at the bargaining table to compensate their members for
unfavorable job characteristics, when "the market" fails to produce such
differentials.'' The result that compensating wage differentials are
larger in the union sector is not unique to risk of injury, others have
found similar results for unfavorable job characteristics like mandatory
overtime requirements.'2
Somewhat surprisingly, most studies fail toconsider the possibility
that interstate, intertemporal, or interindustry variations in the gener-
osity of workers' compensation systems, as measured by income replacement
rates, might affect the magnitude of compensating wage differentials. The
few studies that have, do find that higler income replacement rates reduce10
the magnitude of the wage differential paid for risk of Injury.'3 One
study has also found that higher risks of injury are associated with
higher fringe benefit levels as well as higher wages.'4
Unfortunately, I believe that this voluminous literature provides very
little that is of use for public policy. Presumably one wants to know if
1) the market is providing appropriate incentives for employers to take
actions to reduce injury rates, and 2) the market is fully compensating
workers for risk of injury. As I discuss below, I believe answers to
neither of these questions is provided by these studies.
With respect to the first question, the Issue is really whether the
positive association between wages and risk of injury measures reflects a
compensating wage differential for risk of injury. Jobs may offer a
variety of undesirable working conditions in addition to risk of injury;
these may include having to work in a noisy environment, having to do
repetitive tasks, being required to do heavy lifting, and lacking the
opportunity to make independent judgements. Many of these factors are
probably highly correlated with risk of injury on the job and workers may
demand wage premiums to accept them also. As a result, when one omits
these other job characteristics from the analysis, any effect they have on
wages is captured by the risk of injury variable. Thus, one may well
overstate the true magnitude of the compensating wage differentials for
risk of injury.'5 When a few investigators have included other working
conditions along with risk of injury in wage equations; the risk of injury
variables tends not to be significantly associated with wages.'6 Whether
this is due to the high collinearity of the working conditions variables
(which makes estimates imprecise) or thefailure of a wage—risk of injury
differential to truly exist cannot be determined. In either case, the11
evidence on the existence of compensating wage differentials for risk of
injury is not as well—established as the various studies would have us
believe.
Suppose we ignore this problem and assume that wage differentials for
risk of injury do exist. How could one hope to decide that their magni-
tudes are sufficiently large to permit one to conclude that they fully
compensate workers for the disutility associated with risk of injury? Only
if they are is the case for government intervention to improve occupational
safety weakened. Only if they are can one derive "value of life" estimates
from them to use in benefit/cost studies of occupational safety and health
Interventions.'7
Now If one truly believes that all labor markets are competitive, it
is a tautology that whatever wage differentials are generated by these
markets will be "fully compensating" ones. However, once one allows for
market imperfections the question becomes an empirical one. The mere
existence of some wage differential does not Imply that it is a fully
compensating one.
Estimates of the compensating wage differentials associated with the
risk of fatal injury at the workplace suggest that individuals are paid a
premium of 1 to 4 percent of their wages to compensate them for existing
risks of fatal injury; this leads (given the magnitude of fatal injury
rates to imputed value of lives in the range of $200,000 to $3,500,000.18
Researchers have no way of evaluating (nor have they even tended to
consider) whether differentials in this range truly fully compensate
workers for risk of fatal injury. Hence, their potential usefulness for
public policy in the occupational safety area is limited. At best, they
provide lower—bound estimates of the value of life.12
V.Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels and Work—Injury Experiences:
State Data
In theory, the incidence and duration of work injuries depends both
upon employee and employer actions. Given the discussion in section III,
this suggests that both the level of benefits and the extent of experience
rating should affect injury rates. Yet only two empirical studies, to be
discussed in section VII, have attempted to evaluate the effects of exper-
ience rating. The studies that use statewide data, or Industry by state
data, tend to ignore experience rating and stress the effects of WC benefit
levels on the Incidence and duration of injuries and/or WC claims.
The nine studies summarized in Table 1 fall neatly Into three groups.
First there are three studies by James Chelius ((1973), (1974), (1977))
that use a single year's data and find that, controlling for other factors,
higher WC benefits are associated with a higher frequency of injury but
have no association with duration (severity) of Injury. Second, there are
tw studies by Chelius (1982) (1983) and one by John Ruser (1984) that use
data for a number of years. Chelius (1982) usesdata from 36 states for
the 1972—75 period and finds that higher WC benefits are associated with
more frequent accidents, but fewer days per case, so that on balance they
have no association with the total lost work day rate. His later study
(Chellus (1983)) uses data for fewer 'states (28), but a longer period
(1972—1978) and finds that while the WC benefit—frequency association is
still observed, the benefit—days per case relationship vanishes. As a
result, higher benefits are associated with an increased total lost work
day rate in this study. Whether the differences in results between the two
studies reflect changes in behavior that occurred in 1976—78, or the
dropping of 8 states from the sample is not investigated by Chelius.13
Fi;nally, Ruser (1984) uses data from 41 states for the 1972—79 period and
finds that higher WC benefits are associated with higher frequencies of
injuries and days lost from work.
Focusing on Chelius (1982), one might ask how higher benefits could
simultaneously increase frequency but decrease duration? Unfortunately,
there are a number of possible explanations which the data do not permit us
to disentangle. Higher benefits might induce the report—ing of minor
injuries, that otherwise would go unreported, and that tend to be of short
duration. They might induce workers to take more risks on the job, but
only in situations that will not lead to increased risk of serious long—
term injuries. Finally, they might Induce employers to concentrate
accident prevention resources where long—term Injuries are possible, to
more frequently challenge long—term claims, or to "encourage' injured
workers to return to work more rapidly. Presumably data on WC claims
challenges are available, however, to my knowledge, no researcher has
attempted to analyze if employer challenges of WC claims (either at the
outset or while a claim Is in progress) are related to the level of WC
benefits.
The third group of studies analyze different types of data. Richard
Butler (1983) focused on data from one state, South Carolina, over a long
time period and found that an ihdex of average real annual WC payments for
various types of injuries in the state was positively associated with the
frequency of almost all types of injuries. Butler and John Worrall (1983)
used WC claims data for 35 states over the 1972—78 period and computed
estimates in each state/year of the levels of various types of WC benefits.
They found heneUt levels were associat1 primarily with pe.rmanent partial
claims rates not with temporary total ones. While an increase in the minor
(major) permanent partial benefit level was associated with a higher minor14
(major) permanent partial injury rate, an increase In the malor permanent
partial benefit level also reduced the incidence of minor permanent partial
claims.'9
This latter result is intriguing as it suggests that injured workers
have some control over how they attempt to get their claims classified
(major or minor injury). This takes us back to the possibility that at
least part of the observed WC effect on Injury rates may simply be a
reporting effect.2° Evidence to support this view Is presented by Worrall
and Apley (1982) who found that higher income replacement rates for
temporary total injuries have been associated over time in Texas with an
increase in the ratios of temporary total claims and all indemnity claims
to medical only claims.
-
Similarly,Chelius (1982) found that frequency rates for injuries that
involve no lost days appear not to be sensitive to WC benefit levels;
since the waiting period in most states is at least three days, workers
have no added incentive to report injuries in this category in the face of
higher benefits.21 He argues that any positive relationship here would
Indicate a real association between WC benefits and this short—tern injury
rate and this is not observed. Two studies (Chelius (1982), Butler and
Worrall (1983)) also found that longer waiting periods are associated with
decreased injury rates or WC claims; whether this is a reporting or real
affect was not be ascertained.
Taken together these studies strongly suggest that increases in WC
benefits are asscciated with higher Injury and workers' compensation claim
rates, with at least some fraction of the increase being a pure "reporting'
or "classification" effect. They do not, however, provide any strong
evidence on duration of claims, or injuries, primarily because increased
frequency results in changes in the mix, or types, of injuries reported.15
To accurately analyze the effects of WC benefit levels on duration of
claims requires data on individual WC claims; two studies which do this are
discussed in the next section.
The studies described in this section have become methodologically
more sophisticated over time, controlling for more variables, and using
more refined data. Nonetheless, their conclusions should be probably
tempered for at least two reasons. First, conclusions about the effects of
WC benefits on injury or injury claim rates are essentially drawn from
observations on the association between benefit levels ad injury rates
across states, or the association between changes In benefit levels and
changes in injury rates over time. Very little concern has been expressed
that high injury rates in a state induce pressure to have generous WC
benefits, or that increases in injury rates create pressure to increase
benefit levels. Put another way, there have been only limited efforts
(see, for example, Chelius (1974)) to test for the possibility that the
direction of causation runs from injury rates to benefit levels rather than
visa versa.
Second, the WC system is a complex system which involves much more
than simply specifying the benefit level and waiting period. For example,
presumably the extent of experience rating differs across states (and over
time) as does administrative stringency in processing claims, and the
propensity of employers to challenge claims.22 In contrast to research on
unemployment insurance, where these factors have been considered, WC
research has tended to ignore them.23 If these variables are correlated
with WC benefit levels, their omission will distort the estimated benefit
level—injury rate relationship.16
VI. Workers' Compensation Benefit Levels and the Duration of Compensation Claims
In a series of two papers, Richard Butler and John Worrall (1984) and
Worrall and Butler (1985) have used data on individual WC claimants in the
state of Illinois to analyze the effects of WC benefit levels on the
duration of temporary total disability claims.24 The data is confined to
one state to control for other aspects of the WC system and to one type of
indemnity claim, those arising from low—back injuries, to mitigate the
problem of varying mixes of injury types found in more aggregate data. The
data come from a National Council on Compensation Insurance sample of
claimants in 12 states, that began in April 1979 and followed the claimants
for 42 months.
To analyze these data requires estimation methods that take account of
the fact that some claimants are still receiving benefits at the end of the
42 month period. The two papers use appropriate methods, differing only
in the specific stochastic assumptions and assumptions about unobservable
variables that they make. These methods have previously been applied to
problems of unemployment insurance and unemployment duration so their
papers build directly on research on another social insurance program.25
Both papers yield the same important result: After controlling for
other factors, the higher an individual's income replacement ratio under
the WC program, the less likely he is to leave claimant status and hence
the longer his expected duration of WC claim. In their preferred specifi-
cation in one paper, a 10 percent increase in benefits is predicted to
increase average claim duration by .23 weeks (or one day), which represents
a 2 percent increase in the lengthening of the average claim.26 Whether
this statistically significant result is large enough to be of "policy
significance" is left to the reader to evaluate.2717
These papers represent, by far, the most sophisticated econometric
treatments found in workers' compensation research and the advantages of
using data for a single state and type of injury are evident. Nonetheless,
they are not without problems. In particular, at a point in time in a
single state, the income 'replacement ratio an Individual is scheduled to
receive Is a negative function of his previous earnings.
To see why this creates problems, consider how the typical WC schedule
operates. Referring to the top panel of Figure 1, there Is a minimum WC
benefit level, BmIn, in the state. If an individual's pre—injury earnings
fall In the range Emi to Emax, then WC benefits Increase with earnings.
Individuals who previously earned or more receive the maximum
benefit level In the state, Bmax. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the
implied income replacement rate (B/E) for this schedule. It Is constant
(at about 213 in most states) between Emi and Emax, however, outside
this region it obviously is negatively related to previous earnings.
If the Income replacement rate an individual faces Is an exact inverse
function of his previous earnings, one cannot meaningfully speak, at a
point In time, of varying the rate independently of previous earnings. If
both previous earnings and the income replacement rate appear to influence
duration of WC claims, this may reflect only that previous earnings affects
duration in a nonlinear fashion. Without independent variation in the
Income replacement rate we cannot ascertain if we are really estimating the
effect of WC benefit levels on duration.
Some independent variation may have In fact existed In the Butler—
Worrall data.28 For example, some individuals received lump—sum benefit
awards rather than weekly benefits. In ,hese cases, Butler and Worral.j.
divided these amounts by the indivIduals' actual number of claim weeks to
obtain a measure of their weekly WC benefits. This approach causes18
individualswith randomly long claim durations to have randomly low
reported income replacement rates. Hence, Butler and Worrall would
state the true effect of WC benefits on duration. A further problem is that
one would expect lump—sum awards to have a different effect on claim
durations than a contingent weekly award. Their approach does not permit
this to occur.
The conclusion one reaches here is that while the use of data from one
state has its advantages, it also creates obvious problems. One senses
that data from more than one state is required, although this would require
researchers to take other characteristics of the state and state WC systems
into account. Studies of the effect of unemployment insurance benefits on
duration of unemployment have used individual data from more than one
state, exploiting the interstate variation that occurs in replacement
rates.29 The 12 state NCCI sample may prove a very useful data base for a
similar analysis in the workers' compensation area.
VileExperienceRating
In spite of the important role that experience rating plays in
determining employers' responses (in theory) to an increase in WC benefits,
there has been only two published attempts to empirically analyze if
experience rating affects injury rates. The sole published study, Chelius
and Smith (1983), exploit the fact that small, manually rates, firms are
not experience rated, while very large firms are perfectly experience
rated. Focusing in a state on firms within a single industry, the dif-
ference between injury rates in small and large firms obviously will
reflect many factors besides the differance in experience rating. However,
other things equal, the higher WC benefits in the state the greater they
argue the incentive faced by large firms to reduce their injury rates and19
thus the smaller the difference should be. They test if experience rating
matters by seeing if, across states, higher WC benefits are associated with
lower values of the difference in injury rates between small and large
firms in each of 15 2—digit manufacturing industries. They conclude that
their data does not permit them to ascertain any effects of experience
rating; if present, the effects are too small to be picked up with the
crude data they use.
Taken at face value their results suggest that the safety effects of
experience rating are sufficiently small that policymakers need not worry
that many firms face imperfect or no experience rating. One must be
cautious, however,in drawing this conclusion for several reasons in
addition to the ones the authors offer relating to the nature of the data
they use.
First, within an industry benefit levels vary across states, both
because of differences in the generosity of state WC systems and because of
interstate differences in average wages. The latter may reflect dif-
ferences in the skill mix of workers. Any observed (or lack of observed)
correlation between benefits and injury rate differences between large and
small firms across states may reflect the interaction of skill mix and firm
size on injury rates.
Second, average wage differences with a 2—digit industry across states
may reflect differences in the 3 or 4—digit industry mix across states and
there is no reason to suppose that the injury rate—firm size relationship
Is constant across 3 or 4—digit industries. This makes it difficult, using
their method, to separate out the effects of WC benefits from the effects
of Industry mix.20
Finally, average wage differences across states may reflect dif-
ferences in the large firm/small firm wage rate differential within
states.3° If wage rates differ between firms in a state, injury rates may
also differ for reasons completely independent of experience rating.3'
One senses from all of this that efforts to estimate the effects of
experience rating using aggregate state by industry data, even when
stratified by firm size, are not likely to prove, fruitful. At first
glance, a more promising strategy appears to be to obtain data at the
individual firm level, to impute a marginal workers' compensation cost
variable per injury for the firm (using algorithms based on knowledge of the
experience rating system rules and characteristics of the firm) and then to
test for the effects of this variable on future injury rates at the firm.32
Unfortunately, the marginal cost per injury a firm faces, given its
size and wages, will depend upon its prior injury rate experience. To the
extent that injury rates are correlated over time at a firm, this creates
serious statistical problems; it may prove impossible to disentangle the
effect of experience rating on injury rates from the effect of injury rates
on experience rating. While this effort is worth pursuing, it will require
longitudinal data and a careful consideration of statistical issues.33
VIII. Workers' Compensation and Labor Supply
Several studies have addressed the issue of how permanent partial WC
benefits affect labor supply, highlighting the distinction between
scheduled and nonscheduled benefits.34 William Johnson (1983) focused on
workers injured in New York State in 1970 who were found eligible for
scheduled benefits. These scheduled benefits are specified as weekly
amounts for given durations; they are not related to actual wage loss
during the period received. Johnson found small labor supply effects of21
benefit levels in 1971, but by 1974 benefit levels appeared to affect
neither labor force participation nor hours of work. He suggested that
switching to nonscheduled benefits, which are contingent on wage loss,
would have the obvious potential to decrease labor supply.
Some support for this view is found in John Burton (1983). Burton
used time—series data for New York State from 1959 to 1979 and found that
increases in the unemployment rate were associated with a larger number of
nonscheduled cases but not with any change in the number of scheduled
cases. WC payments in the former case are contingent on wage loss and
increases in the unemployment rate make it harder for disabled workers to
find jobs that compensate them at the level of their pre—injury jobs.
Burton also found, however, that higher benefit levels reduced the
number of nonscheduled permanent partial cases. While it is possible that
this reflects employer efforts to prevent Injuries or injury claims
dominating over any reduced employee actions to promote safety, it must be
stressed that this latter result flies in the face of all of the evidence
summarized in Table 1. Burton's twenty year time—series analysis does not
appear to control for changes in the industry/occupation/age/gender
distribution of the labor force; all factors which should Influence
compensation costs and injury rates.35 To the extent that these variables
are correlated with changes in benefit levels over time, the observed
effect of benefits on nonscheduled claims may actually reflect the effects
of these other variables.
IX. Concluding Remarks
A long critical summary of the liteature In an area requires no
summary. However, several substantive propositions are worth repeating
that have relevance for policy in the occupational safety and health area.22
First, the evidence on compensating wage differentials for risk of
injury is no where near as solid as producers of the evidence believe.
Even if we take estimates of differentials at face value, and assume that
all other nonrisk related conditions of emnloyment have been fully con-
trolled for, the existence of a differential does not imply that workers are
fully compensated for the risk of injury they face. At best, such esti-
mates can be used to provide lower—bound estimates of the "value of life",
which in turn can be used In benefit/cost analyses of various occupational
safety and health policies. They can not be used to draw conclusions about
how well markets are working.
Second, higher workers' compensation benefits do appear to to increase
the frequency of injury rates and workers' compensation claims, although we
cannot separate out with any precision how much of the increase is "real"
and how much is merely a "reporting" effect. If the system is at least
partially experience rated (which it is) and labor markets are not per-
fectly competitive (which they probably are not) higher workers' compen-
sation benefits should induce employers to try to prevent accidents and/or
challenge more claims. The fact that a positive relationship between
frequency and benefits is observed implies that employees' responses to
higher benefits dominates, on balance, over employers' responses.
The trick then is to alter•existing policy to increase employers'
Incentives to improve safety without altering employees' incentives. One
possibility is to hold benefit levels at their current real levels but to
increase the extent of experience rating. As discussed above, there is no
real evidence that this would work and, in any case, such a policy would be
strongly opposed by unions. The reason or this is that increased exper-
ience rating Increases employers' incentives to challenge workers' claims23
for benefits. For this very reason, unions have been vocal opponents of
attempts to increase experience rating in the unemployment insurance
system.
An alternative is to increase the payroll tax but not the level of
benefits and to use the excess of revenue over benefits to fund other
safety and health programs.36 To the extent that experience rating does
matter, this will provide employers with increased incentives to improve
safety. Similar proposals have previously been suggested in the overtime
pay area——increasing the tax on overtime hours but not the overtime premium
paid to workers——and have been supported by at least some unions.37
Of course, the fact that increasing workers' compensation benefits
does appear to increase the frequency of injury rates and/or workers'
compensation claims does not imply in itself that further benefit increases
are undesirable (or are desirable). Rather, it only tells us that there is
a trade—off between higher, more adequate, benefits and higher injury rates
and claims. Where along the trade—off we ultimately locate will depend
upon policy makers' judgments about the optimal combination of adequacy and
safety given the trade—off that researchers have found. For example, taken
at face value the results in Chelius (1983) suggest that raising the income
replacement rate in a state by 10 percent relative to the national average
would increase the number of injuries per 100 full—time workers in a state
relative to the national average by 1.6 percent. Whether such an action
would, on balance, be desirable is for policy makers to decide.
Finally, it is worth restressing that very little is known about the
effects of other characteristics of the WC system, such as administrative
stringency, the frequency of employer challenges, and the frequency of the24
use of attorneys in claims cases, on the frequency and duration of claims.
Research on the causes of, and effects of, these other characteristics,
would clearly help policy makers improve the design of the WC system.3825
Footnotes
1. Much more detailed discussions of the WC system are presented
elsewhere. For example, see John Burton (1983), John Burton and Monroe
Berkowitz (1982), Richard Victor (1982), Richard Victor, Linda Cohen, and
Charles Phelps (1982), and John Worrall (1983b). My discussion, which is
unabashedly pirated from them, is necessarily brief and nontechnical.
2. Burton and Berkowitz (1982), P. 80.
3. A more detailed discussion of experience rating is found in Victor
(1982).
4. The discussion here draws heavily on previous discussions. See
the sources cited in footnote 1 as well as James' Chelius (1974)(1977)
(1983). I have again abstracted from many details of theprogram and
ignored a host of issues.
5. If workers have different degrees of risk aversion,they will sort
themselves across firms so that those with the least aversion to risk will
be in the high risk firms. The marketwage differential between low and
high risk firms will understate the wage differential that workers at low
risk firms would demand to move to high risk firms.
6. If workers were risk averse, they would prefer thecertainty of
workers' compensation benefits when an injury occurs toa risk premium with
the same expected value. As a result, in this case the introduction ofWC
benefits would improve workers' welfare. One shouldcaution, however, that
in this situation, the resulting decline in the riskpremium would exceed
the actuarial value of the WC benefits, which would decreaseemployers'
incentives to prevent risks. Thus, again the the Injury ratemight rise
relative to that which would prevail in the absence of thesystem.26
7. In a world where all WC costs are not shifted on to workers, in
the form of lower wages, or to consumers, in the form of higher prices,
there also would be employment effects.See Ronald Ehrenberg, Robert
Hutchens and Robert Smith (1978) for a discussion of the evidence on the
shifting of the payroll tax.
8. For both of these reasons, a decline in the length of the waiting
period before benefits can be received would also increase the number of WC
claims.
9. The pre—1979 studies are summarized in Robert Smith (1979).
Examples of later studies include Charles Brown (1980), Burton (1983),
Richard Butler and John Worrall (1983), William Dickens (1984), Richard
Freeman and James Medoff (1981), Craig Olsen (1981), Robert Smith and Alan
Dillingham (1984), and W. Kip Viscusi (1978) (1979) (1980). Recent
attempts that use longitudinal data include Greg Duncan and Bertil Homlund
(1984).
10. See Dickens (1984), Freeman and Medoff (1981), Olsen (1981), and
Viscusi (1979), for example. Smith and Dillingham (1984) find this result
in 1973 data, but not in 1977 or 1979 data.
11. See John Worrall and Richard Butler (1983) and Greg Duncan and
Frank Stafford (1980).
12. See Ronald Ehrenberg nd Paul Schumann (1984).
13. See Richard Arnould and Len Nichols (1983), Richard Butler
(1983), Stuart Dorsey (1983) and Dorsey and Norman Waizer (1983).
14. Dorsey (1983).
15. This criticism is really directed at the whole "compensating wage
differential" literature and is not unique to studies of risk of injury.
16. For example, Brown (1980).
17. See Ehrenberg and Smith (1982), pp. 221—222 for examples.27
18. See Smith (1979).
19. Major claims are considered more serious than minor ones; the
classification depends upon the magnitude of the indemnity payment for the
injury. This raises the possibility that what is considered a major claim
may vary across states.
20. As noted above, Butler and Worrall (1983) find WC benefits have a
larger effect on permanent partial than temporary total claims. The effect
on permanent partial claims is unlikely to reflect primarily a reporting
effect.
21. Chelius (1982), p. 239.
22. The structure of experience rating is the same across most states
at a point in time. However, the actual extent of experience rating in a
state will vary across states with the size distribution of firms, their
wage rates, and prior injury experiences. Hence, in principle, one can
compute estimates of the extent of experience rating, or of the proportion
of firms who are a) not subject to experience rating or b) perfectly
experience rated, and use these in the analyses. There are, of course,
obvious econometric problems with this approach.
23, Studies of the effects of administrative stringency in the
unemployment insurance literature include Gary Solon (1984) and Stanley
Horowitz (1977). Studies of the effects of experience rating include
Frank Brechling (1981) and Robert Topel (1983).
24. Their research builds on related work for Great Britain by N.
Doherty (1979) and Paul Fenn (1981).
25. See Chris Flinn and James Heckman (1982) and T. Lancaster (1979),
for example.
26. Worrall. and Butler (1985).28
27. •They also find that when a lawyer represents a claimant, the
duration of claim is longer. This returns us to the whole issue of
administrative stringency and legal challenges. Their data permit them to
analyze some of the factors that influence the presence of an attorney.
28. This paragraph draws on a telephone conversation with Richard
Butler.
29. See, for example, Ronald Ehrenberg and Ronald Oaxaca (1976).
30. Consider the extreme case where small firms in every state paid
the same wage. Higher average wage in a state would reflect higher large
firm wages and hence a greater small firm/large firm wage differential.
31. For example, wage differentials between large and small firms may
reflect skill differences; it is well known that injury rates are
related to workers' skills.
32. Victor (1982) has developed such an algorithm.
33. In an unpublished paper, Ruser (1984) also attempts to test for
the effects of experience rating on injury rates. He argues that large
firms are more likely to be experience rated and thus that higher WC
benefit levels should reduce injury rates more in large firms than in
small. Empirically he tests whether the effect of WC benefit levels on the
average Injury rate In a state—industry cell Is negatively related to the
average size of firms in the cell; and finds some support for this
hypotheses.
34. A number of related studies estimate the effect of the social
security disability program on labor force participation rates. See, for
example, Robert Haveman and Barbara Wolf (1984) (forthcoming), Jonathan
Leonard (1979), and Donald Parson (l980a) (1980b) (1984). These studies
tend to focus on the labor force participation rates of all older workers,
not the rates for a sample of claimants as Johnson does.29
35. See, for example, Alan Dillingham (1983).
36. Chelius (1982) has previously suggested this.
37. See Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982), Chapter 8, for a discussion of
these proposals. The United Automobile Workers (UAW) has been a noted
supporter of them.
38. Some suggestive evidence on how the benefits to litigating WC
claims varies across states is presented in Butler, Kearl, and Worrall
(1984).30
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b
e
n
e
f
i
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
f
o
r
 
a
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t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
 
t
o
t
a
l
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m
i
n
o
r
 
p
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n
s
.
 
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
 
c
)
 
e
a
j
o
r
 
p
a
r
t
s
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
 
i
n
j
u
r
i
e
s
 
(
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
l
a
w
s
,
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
w
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
 
w
a
g
e
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
—
 
t
i
o
n
s
)
 
f
o
r
 
n
o
n
—
s
e
l
f
—
i
n
s
u
r
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
s
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o
r
 
A
)
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
B
)
 
m
i
n
o
r
 
p
e
r
m
.
 
p
a
r
t
i
a
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)
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
p
e
n
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i
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i
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p
e
r
i
o
d
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
r
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i
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c
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—
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o
r
r
a
l
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a
n
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5
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—
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a
t
a
 
f
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I
n
c
o
m
e
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
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a
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C
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a
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p
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t
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t
a
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f
 
T
e
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e
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r
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r
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o
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n
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r
i
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h
e
 
s
t
a
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e
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o
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a
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c
l
a
i
m
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f
 
m
e
d
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c
a
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n
l
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c
l
a
i
m
s
 
A
l
l
 
i
n
d
e
m
n
i
t
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c
l
a
i
m
s
/
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
o
n
l
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c
l
a
i
m
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I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
I
n
c
r
e
m
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e
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o
u
r
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A
u
t
h
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r
'
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n
t
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r
p
r
e
t
a
t
i
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o
f
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t
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r
i
a
l
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
s
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
B
u
t
l
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
W
o
r
r
a
l
l
 
(
1
9
8
3
)
 
r
o
w
,
a
"
+
"
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
,
 
a
 
"
0
"
 
n
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
"
—
"
 
a
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
.
 